Intrusion-Tolerant Middleware: The Road to Automatic Security

P. Veríssimo, N. F. Neves, C. Cachin, J. Poritz, D. Powell, Y. Deswarte, R. Stroud, I. Welch

IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 54-62, Jul./Aug. 2006.


Abstract

The pervasive interconnection of systems throughout the world has given computer services a significant socioeconomic value that both accidental faults and malicious activity can affect. The classical approach to security has mostly consisted of trying to prevent bad things from happening. But what if we could address both faults and attacks in a seamless manner, through a common approach to security and dependability? Using ideas from fault tolerance that put emphasis on automatically detecting, containing, and recovering from attacks, the European project MAFTIA set out to develop an architecture and a comprehensive set of mechanisms and protocols for tolerating both accidental faults and malicious attacks in complex systems. Here, we report some of the advances made.


BibTeX

@Article{verissimo06itmiddleware,

 author = {P. Ver\'{\i}ssimo, N. F. Neves, C. Cachin, J. Poritz, D. Powell, Y. Deswarte, R. Stroud, I. Welch},

 title = {Intrusion-Tolerant Middleware: The Road to Automatic Security},

 journal = {IEEE Security & Privacy},

 volume = {4},

 number = {4},

 year = {2006},

 pages = {54--62},

 publisher = {IEEE},

 }


Extended Version

Download the pdf.